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Democracy and Citizenship: expanding domains 
 
Michael Saward 
 
For the published version of this chapter, see: J. Dryzek, B. Honig and A. Phillips 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
Contemporary political theory includes lively debates about the meaning and scope of 
both democracy and citizenship. Some take a pessimistic view, arguing in particular 
that both democracy and citizenship are ‘hollowing out’, maintaining for example that 
citizenship roles and practices have become enfolded within those of the ‘consumer’ 
(Clarke), as part of the expansion of market thinking in politics.  Relatedly, others 
maintain that we live in a time of ‘audience democracy’ (Manin 1997), or 
‘spectatorial democracy’ (Zolo), in which citizens are passive and pacified observers 
of a political game which enfolds them symbolically if at all.  In this context, we 
could say that ‘expanding domains’ include the expansion of economic conceptions of 
marketised, passive consumption into the realm of democratic citizenship.  
 
But for much of normative political theory the idea of expanding domains has a 
progressive ring too; theorists seek to address this perceived ‘hollowing out’, thinning 
or weakening of both democracy and citizenship.  Theorists who write about 
democracy and citizenship are, by and large, strong democrats; in varied and 
contested ways, they seek democratic extension and reinvigoration.  Real advances in 
citizenship practice flow from real political struggles, of course.  But struggle and 
progressive theory go hand in hand.  In this chapter, first, I will explore key ways in 
which elements of contemporary innovative conceptions of democracy – deliberative, 
‘difference’, cosmopolitan, ecological and others - seek to reconstruct and reconstrue 
citizens and citizenship (and often disagree with each other in the process, within and 
across these categories of innovation). I shall do this by pinpointing some key ways in 
which these innovations seek to expand the domains of democratic citizenship by 
reconfiguring (1) where we find citizens, (2) how they are construed, and (3) what 
expectations are held of them.  Secondly, I try to respond to the challenges posed by 
innovative theories, by showing how the core notions of political representation and 
democracy itself need to be reconfigured in order to enable us to apply them 
meaningfully, and to continue the recommendatory tasks of political theory, in an era 
of scepticism, rapid political change and social complexity. 
 
One approach I do not adopt here is to describe ‘master discourses’ of Liberal and 
Republican (and perhaps as well Communitarian and Radical) approaches to 
democracy and citizenship.  Broadly Liberal conceptions stress the individual and his 
or her rights and interests.  Broadly Republican conceptions stress self-government, 
the public interest and citizen striving to realise both. We could construct relatively 
artificial ideal-types of both and use them to frame our discussion.  However, it is 
more helpful to go down a level of detail and nuance from the start, rather than to seek 
too much reduction to overarching categories; to look at specific contemporary 
democratic innovations which nonetheless draw, in distinctive and partial ways, on 
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liberal, republican and other broader conceptions (deliberative models of democracy, 
for instance, draw upon threads in republican thinking).   
 
One should start with definitions, of course.  At one important level, ‘democracy’ and 
‘citizenship’ are signifiers (or – can be and are used as signifiers) standing for a 
variety of practices, institutions and ideas.  In that sense, these concepts to not mean 
one thing, but can mean a range of things.  At the same time, they can’t mean just 
anything.  Citizenship is about membership of or inclusion in a political community, 
and the rights, obligations and expectations which follow from membership. It can be 
seen as a (formal or informal) statuses and identities, along with a set of (formal and 
informal) practices or actions.  Democracy’s defining principles are popular rule and 
political equality (Beetham 1999), however exactly those concepts are interpreted.  
These democratic principles can be crystallised into definitions that stress further 
principles (e.g. majoritarianism), or institutional structures (e.g. parliamentarism) or 
attributes (e.g. active political participation).   
 
My frame, then, will be the idea of ‘expanding domains’ (though expansions on one 
front may involve contractions on another).  New conceptions of democracy challenge 
much received wisdom, including by seeking to extend our ideas of citizenship.  New 
conceptions of democracy stretch the idea of democratic citizenship in kind, breadth 
and depth.  Specifically, I shall ask of the innovative approaches to democracy: 
 
1. Where does democracy find or see its citizens? 
 
It is common, when discussing citizenship, to ask about its ‘extent’, who is included 
and who excluded1.  My first question encompasses a concern with extent but seeks to 
go beyond it.  Theorists and others find or locate citizens within states or other 
territorial communities – broader ‘arenas’ if you like.  But they also find or see 
citizens acting out their citizenship in specific other sorts of locale too, physical 
locations or functional ones. Some actions in some places are understood as citizen 
actions, even defining of citizenly action; differences about what those places and 
actions are take us to the hart of key debates around democracy and citizenship today. 
 
2. How does it construct or construe them? 
 
Discussions of both democracy and citizenship regularly take as unproblematic the 
identities of constituents and citizens.  However, a key thread in recent theory has 
been the unstable and uncertain process of construction of identities and subject roles 
in both democracy and citizenship.  Citizens are made not born, and how they are 
made, what casts are used to mould them in obvious and non-obvious ways, ought not 
to be overlooked.  Hence the construction and construal of citizens, the forging of 
(and the failure to forge?) citizen identities appropriate to different conceptions of 
democracy. 
 
3.    What does it expect or demand of them? 
 
Expectations on democratic citizens depend on how those citizens are understood, in 
terms of their inclinations, identities and capacities or competences.  Often 
                                                          
1 See Isin and Turner (2002).  Their account of the ‘three fundamental axes of citizenship’ – extent, 
content, and depth – overlaps in various ways with my three questions.   
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expectations, or at least hopes, centre around mutual recognition and respect around 
certain civil, political and social rights, and the obligations to act in certain ways that 
come with those rights and their protection.  Democratic innovations seek to extend 
the domains of expectorations in some revived, and some imaginatively new, 
directions, as we shall see. 
 
In the paper’s first section I shall ask these three questions of a range of interventions 
in the form of several popular but partial conceptions of democracy – liberal 
representative, deliberative, difference, cosmopolitan, ecological, direct and 
associative. Sometimes these views of citizenship flow explicitly from work within 
these democratic innovations.  I will not cover a set number of innovations under each 
question, and nor do I wish to suggest that these form coherent, complete bodies of 
thought (far from it, contestation is great within as well as across these innovations). 
At other times, I consider what these innovations might most plausibly say, given 
other things they say.   
 
 
Democratic innovations and citizenship 
 
 
1. Where does democracy find its citizens? 
 
Growing haphazardly and with multiple variations out of the American and French 
revolutions, democracy came to be practiced in (and only practicable) a territorial 
entity with definite borders wrapped around a people who constituted a nation. The 
primary democratic mechanism was formal political representation based on 
elections, in the context of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law.  Democracy, 
in this conception, found (and finds) its citizens inside those legal and physical 
borders.  Citizens are nationals, members of that nation.   
 
A common, ‘thin’ conception of citizenship might stop the discussion right there.  
Formal inclusion within, or expulsion from, the nation-state defines where citizens are 
to be ‘found’, and further differentiation is undesirable and unnecessary.  According 
to this view, you are equally a citizen whatever your religion, cultural and ethnic 
background, ‘race’, class and so on; these particularities of your identity do not 
impinge on your citizenship status, which is universal for members. 
 
Citizenship as basic membership of the nation-state carries rights to freedom, redress, 
and political participation.  These rights have often been won through bloody struggle 
by the excluded – working men, then women – in many countries.  The precise way in 
which these are understood from one democratic country to another, of course.  
Nonetheless, contemporary democratic systems are largely liberal democratic ones, 
where liberal conceptions of rights and freedoms underpin a broader notion of 
individuals pursuing, largely and rightfully unimpeded, their interests or happiness.  
Within this universalist liberal conception, there are more specific spaces in which 
citizens are to be found – or more accurately where citizenly actions are to be seen.  
Arguably, the key one is the polling booth – citizens as people in paradigmatic 
moments exercising their rights to pursue their interests by making choices about their 
rulers in privacy.  The supposedly neutral ‘individual’ and ‘citizen’ in this conception 
is modelled on the idealised vision of the white male in western societies and how he 
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has been understood – independent, cultured, possessed of clear interests and inclined 
to pursue them (Pateman 1987).   
 
Liberal and liberal democratic traditions are not uniform.  Nonetheless, they largely 
buy into this universalist approach to citizenship with few additional ‘places’ to find 
or see citizenly acts other than the polling booth (workplaces, the home, and even the 
streets – apart from a measured amount of peaceful and lawful protest – are by and 
large not seen as ‘political’ spaces, or at least it is not desirable that they be treated as 
such by citizens).  But this conception is challenged.  In a nutshell: various innovative 
new democratic approaches press us to ask whether we should recognised citizen 
actions as valid and even desirable in varied other spaces too: in private as well as in 
public spaces and activities; outside the borders as well as in them; in the intensity of 
activity rather than specified activities; or even beyond the boundaries of the category 
of ‘people’.   
 
Deliberative democrats, for example, wish to add another layer of where citizens are 
found – namely in forums.  According to the deliberative idea citizens come together 
in forums to do those things that are most citizenly, and which are most intensely 
connected to the heart of democracy – talk, dialogue, reasoning together, becoming 
informed together and making decisions that reflect more than narrow self-interest 
and non-deliberative preferences (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Fishkin 1997; Dryzek 
2000). The forum is a place-metaphor for  clubs, parties, homes, associations, 
workplaces, special media locations and events, in public demonstrations, and so on, 
each and all of which expand the domains in which citizens are founded, and citizen 
actions (it is hoped, by advocates) occur.  The contrast with the polling-booth-and-
little-more liberal conception is drawn (a little too) starkly, but nevertheless the point 
is clear and accurate enough.  A good deal of deliberative thinking is influenced by 
strands of republican thinking about citizenship and public life (Pettit).  Deliberative 
forums can be of different kinds – from familiar liberal democratic ones like 
parliaments to unfamiliar ones with democratic potential such as spontaneous local 
citizen groups and specially designed randomly-selected groups. When and where 
people deliberate, ideally they exhibit citizenly virtues of participation, tolerance, 
recognition of others, and so on.  The paradigmatic liberal democratic activity of 
voting does not carry the promise of such virtue-fostering capacity. 
 
‘Deliberative democracy’ covers a multitude of variants, however.  In terms of where 
citizens are found or seen, consider in particular the quite restricted overall picture 
that emerges from a broad survey of the the range of forums noted in the deliberative 
democracy literature: 
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Table 1: A typology of deliberative forums 
 
Deliberative forum Formal Informal 
 
Representative 
 
A Parliament and linked 
institutions such as Select 
Committees; deliberative 
opinion polls linked to 
referendums or initiatives? 
 
B Deliberative opinion 
polls which are not 
state-sponsored; 
citizens’ juries; some 
‘focus groups’ 
 
 
Non-representative 
 
C Supreme or High courts with 
constitution-interpreting 
functions; cabinets in 
appointive systems (e.g. US) 
 
 
D Associations (state-
sponsored or otherwise); 
political parties (state-
funded or otherwise, 
especially in multi-party 
systems); ‘protected 
enclaves’; ‘subaltern 
counterpublics’; 
‘discursive designs’ 
 
 
From table 1, we can see that most deliberative forums do not involve citizens 
directly; and that the ones that do generally lack decisional power and broader 
democratic legitimacy.  We might hope that our elected politicians, and judges, will 
be good citizens.  But across the range of forums considered in table 1, it is the 
informal spaces and groups,  which can embrace the widest array of citizens and 
citizenly action.  Yet these are relatively marginal in our political systems – not part 
of conventional representative structures, and therefore lacking on conventional 
democratic legitimacy, as well as being detached from formal decisional processes.  
In sum, deliberationists extend the domains of where we might find or see citizens 
and citizenly acts, but the picture they offer us is highly varied and the extent of its 
departure from liberal limitations should not be exaggerated. 
  
So-called difference democrats have offered critiques of the limited range of forums 
concerned. Certainly difference democrats like Iris Young have been keen to promote 
societies as a single forum or a series of forums in which subordinated voices can 
speak of their aspirations and experiences alongside dominant groups – and with it a 
notion of citizenship which emphasises radical dialogical engagement and inclusion.  
We might say that one thread of deliberative thinking in recent democratic theory has 
been Rawlsian – a limited range of more or less circumscribed forums whose goal is 
achieving commonality of citizen action and outlook (Rawls 1997)2- and another has 
been radical, stressing the importance of less circumscribed or controlled sites of 
deliberation and contestation (and these as paradigmatic spaces, or potential spaces, 
for the enactment of citizenship)3.  Difference democrats do not only stress the public 
                                                          
2 There is much scope to question whether Rawls’s later writings add up to a conception of democracy 
that is deliberative in any substantial sense.  See discussions in Dryzek (2000) and Saward (2002). 
3 An elaboration of the circumscribed/uncircumscribed distinction can be found in Saward (2001). 
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sphere as vital to citizen action; they stress in particular the irreducibly plural 
character of that sphere, a and of the deliberation that may occur between and across 
different groups with different perspectives (Young 2000).  Other influential threads 
stress the importance of conventional representative legislatures achieving a level of 
descriptive representation, in line with a ‘politics of presence’ which is not unduly 
subsumed under a ‘politics of ideas’ (Phillips 1995).  From the earlier roots of 
difference-based critiques in feminist theory, we can pick up further extensions of the 
sites or domains of democratic citizenship – for example, according to some feminist 
critics citizens can be found in the home and the local neighbourhood, and in the 
school and the supermarket, as well as other formal and informal public spaces. 
Amongst such critics there is disagreement about whether to press for the extension of 
‘citizenship’ into caring relationships in the house, for example, or whether this might 
militate against a strong feminist conception of citizenship that must be based on 
active public participation (see Deitz 1987; Lister 2002).  Double-edged though it 
may be, these moves helped conceptions of citizenship to embrace many women, 
whose traditional roles often rendered them less visible in terms of gendered dominant 
conceptions of citizenship (Pateman 1987).  This involves a double agenda – first, 
granting full legal status and access to citizenship rights to women, second to address 
issues of substantive gender inequalities by recognising the domestic and private 
spheres as sites of citizenship practices (as additional places where citizens are to be 
‘found’).   
 
Without ironing out artificially internal differences, ‘difference democrats’ lead us to 
the view that democracy can find its citizens deep in civil society and the domestic 
sphere, as well as in the public sphere of the world of the public economy and politics. 
Advocates of associative democracy (Hirst 1994) offer a more functional version of 
this view.  Associative democrats would find (active, empowered) citizens interacting 
in and through groups at local community level.  There is less emphasis here on issues 
of appropriate forms of deliberative discussion, or of gender inequalities, and more 
emphasis on citizens making genuine choices through local associations. 
 
Deliberative and difference critiques press democrats to see citizens as formal 
members of the nation-state – to be sure – but to go beyond that level to find them in a 
range of forums, outside the conventional public sphere, outside traditional ‘male 
spaces’, partly by a radical, pluralizing rethinking of those very spaces and what they 
can be for citizens.  In part this critique shows the elasticity of ‘citizenship’ as a 
concept – there can be dry and formal and more intensive and less formal sites and 
spaces where democratic citizens might be found.   
 
The more radical deliberative, ‘difference’ and associative  theorists force us to 
rethink where citizens and citizen actins are to be found.  But there remain major 
boundaries which, by and large, they do not cross – those of nation-sate and species, 
respectively.  Let’s consider these in turn briefly, as further extensions of the idea of 
where democracy might find its citizens.   
 
Democratic theory, like other realms of political theory, has had basic assumptions 
challenged by variants of the globalisation thesis over the past 20 years or so.  There 
are sceptics and optimists of varied stripes in these debates.  But many cosmopolitans 
are keen to extend citizenship, in some sense, to supra-national levels – regional or 
global or both.  If international manufacturing processes and CO2 emissions, the 
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deeply imbalanced terms of global trade, and the scourges of war and terrorism cannot 
be contained within or dealt with by single states acting alone, then we need 
democratic structures at these supra-statal levels.  If democracy goes global – which it 
could be in various ways, starting from the transpositions of the nation-state model 
(Held (1995), and working through to more unconventional and less statist views 
(Dryzek 2000) – then surely democratic citizens cannot be rightly regarded as being 
found just within territorial states.  From this perspective, people in other countries 
can be seen as my fellow citizens; formally, though we live in different countries, new 
overarching political structures could make us common, citizenly, members; 
informally, though geographically we are ‘found’ in the same places we are in now, 
our regard or citizenly concern and obligation for teach other.  That statement rolls 
together radically different propositions of course – from the state-model-
transposition of David Held (1995) to the proposition that democratisation requires 
radical discursive and cross-border action outside all state structures, a view 
prominently associated with John Dryzek (2000).  But at one level such visions unite 
around the idea that theorists, on the one hand, and we all as citizens on the other, can 
and should find citizens with whom we share communities of fate which transcend 
simple territorial borders. Why are not those in distant places who die from weapons 
that our taxes buy our obligation, our citizenly brothers and sisters?  In a soft sense, I 
might have citizenly regard for non-compatriots with whom I share (say) an 
ecological community-of-fate. 
 
Such communities of fate may be complex and shifting; economics and politics are 
now about our locations within flows rather than places, networks rather than line 
hierarchies; shifting power rather than located power.  More to the point, and more 
radically, it may be that formally and legally we should be fellow citizens of larger 
federations with the political scope and reach to act upon real trends and issues that 
have emasculated nation-states. 
 
If democratic citizens might be found outside territorial borders, in the different sense 
canvassed, can they – even more unthinkable, this? – be found outside the boundaries 
of humanity itself?  Can the fox family that lives part-time in my inner suburban 
London garden consist, in some sense, of my fellow citizens?  Are they worthy 
objects of my regard (and how do they regard me?), do I share a community of fate 
with them, can the places and spaces they move in and claim be spaces and places of 
citizen action and regard in some transformed sense?  The issues here are ones of 
boundaries of competence and communicative capacity for citizenship – issues which 
are best dealt with under the other questions, considered below.  But in terms of 
where citizens are seen or found, animals are territorial inhabitants; it is just that their 
territoriality works very differently from that of humans (shaped by human action 
though it is), especially in contemporary, highly technological and urbanised societies 
where our reliance on immediate natural surroundings is weak.  Can democratic 
citizens be found in so many more spaces and places – living in forests, in holes in the 
ground, in the air, in the sea?   
 
Where does or can democracy find its citizens?  The answer is increasingly 
differentiated, contested.  But current democratic thinking is challenging and 
extending the location and type of domain concerned.  Traditionally and more 
formally, liberal democracies (and other systems) find and see citizens within nation-
state borders, and within that more often in public than in private, more in the voting 
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booth than the forum. Innovative democratic challengers find them in additional 
places.  Deliberative and difference democrats find citizens in forums, some in varied 
spaces of civil society and in the traditional private sphere as well as the state; 
cosmopolitans and political ecologists may in time tempt us to find them outside the 
borders and across the human-non-human boundary.   
 
 
How does democracy construct or construe its citizens? 
 
Political actors, not least ‘citizens’, do not come to the arena with pre-given and 
complete identities.  Nor do they leave it with newly minted and essential identities.  
Part and parcel of where theorists and others find or see citizens, is what they think 
those citizens are – what they are capable of, what is beyond them, how they see 
themselves, and so on.  In this domain, post-structuralist approaches to citizenship, 
such as that of Mouffe, have been influential in recent years. Such approaches suggest 
that citizen identities, like all identities, are always contingent and subject to change, 
or from another angle to re-construction.  As Mouffe writes, ‘the social agent [is] 
constituted by an ensemble of “subject positions” that can never be totally fixed in a 
closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which 
there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination 
and displacement’ (1993: 77). 
 
But this poststructuralist view is itself one perspective on the construction of citizen 
identities.  It contends with a range of others, from more conventional and more 
innovative democratic thinking.  Liberal democracy, it is often contended, sees its 
citizens as rights-bearing rational actors making choices which serve their interests.  
Although it works through in varied policy and ideological positions, the liberal tenor 
is one of scepticism about government, unless government action can plausibly be 
defended as enabling individual freedom.  The tension built into liberal political 
theory is the simultaneous necessity for the state’s protection and suspicion of its 
motives, and its capacity and even inclination to undermine the very rights it exists to 
protect.   
 
So deeply entrenched is the idea of self-seeking individualism and rights as the core 
depiction of the modern citizen that innovative new democratic models and 
approaches offer partial constructions of citizens and their potentialities which build 
on rather than provide alternatives to liberal democratic orthodoxy.  Many do, 
however, shift the emphasis with respect to potentialities by shifting from citizens as 
the recipients of government decisions that are made in their name, to citizens as the 
direct makers of decisions – or at least direct participants in the process of their 
making.  As a part of so doing, such writers frame questions about citizen 
competences and capacities in ways which, for example, stress moral agency of 
engaged citizenship rather than technical measures of citizen knowledge (see for 
instance Smiley 1999).  Deliberative, direct and associative democrats variously look 
to the design of democratic mechanisms through which under-used and under-
appreciated decision-making capacities of citizens might be channelled and exploited.  
So we have referendums and citizens initiatives and recalls and so on with respect to 
direct democracy; deliberative forums, sometimes for citizen participants and at other 
times for citizens as enlightened audiences; and radical budgetary decentralisation and 
participative serve-delivery through diverse associations for associative democrats 
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(Budge 1996; Smith 2000; Fishkin and Luskin 2000; Hirst 1991).  Lying just behind 
such mechanisms and assumptions is a view of a particular citizen capability to reach 
beyond one’s own narrower interests to recognise and even to encapsulate the 
interests of a variety of other individuals and groups, including perhaps noncompatriot 
and even non-species ones.  To capture some of these reconstructions and reconstruals 
of citizen identities in a blunt manner: deliberative and other democrats see citizens as 
talkers and reasoners as well as calculators and choosers.  Cosmopolitans, in addition 
to seeing empathetic capacities extended to non-national others, catch a sense of 
enhanced reasoning capacities, as do even more radically in some ways ecological 
democrats.  The citizen here is construed as more than capable of achieving an 
‘enlarged mentality’ which enables consideration and empathy with (perhaps radically 
different) others. 
 
To construe the essence of citizen capacity or character in individualistic and 
independent, or communal and situated, or moral and empathetic, is to take factual 
and normative cases about characteristics and to mould, theoretically, an image of 
what the citizen really is or can be in terms of identity.  ‘Difference’ democrats, in a 
style that works with the grain of the poststructuralist view mentioned above, seek to 
resist the easy or hasty assertion of common points of identity among compatriots (or 
other significant groups).  Such efforts at ‘objectivity’ run up against the inevitable 
particularity of our judgements of self and others, and the specificity of issues and 
problems that polities and citizens need to deal with (Young 2000, 113).  Situated, 
differentiated, perspectives are what is brought to public deliberation; ‘speaking 
across difference’ rather than to put difference aside or eliminate it, is a primary goal. 
Citizens may be members of states but they are culturally embedded in more 
particular ways.  They may share outlooks and assumptions but they may also be 
deluded into over-emphasising commonalities when class, gender, religious and other 
perspectives differ so much and have such implications for empowerment and 
disempowerment.  From this point of view, liberal citizenship – along with 
deliberative or cosmopolitan or other variants which argue for the essential and 
common character of specified citizen identities, competences or desires - is in 
tension with the notion of an irreducible plurality of other identities and 
identifications, chosen or otherwise.  From poststructuralist and ‘difference’ points of 
view; a more mature and realistic conception of citizenship would be one which 
allows for, and indeed embraces, the contingencies and multiplicities of identity and 
identification in complex contemporary societies. 
 
What does democracy expect and demand of its citizens? 
 
Where advocates of different views of democracy find or see citizens and citizen 
actions depends upon how those citizens are construed.  How they are construed, 
likewise, has a major impact on what can be expected of democratic citizens.  The 
main framework for discussions of expectations and demands is normally that of 
‘rights and obligations’, and specifically the obligations in terms of citizens respecting 
the rights of others, and acting with a certain level of independence and public 
spiritedness (Smiley 1999). 
 
The liberal-representative model of democracy primarily sees citizens’ obligations in 
terms of obeying the law and playing a political role by voting in elections.  Beyond 
that, generally speaking, the liberal citizen can just get on with it – pursuing their 
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interests and their leisure.  There is no great demand that citizens participate in 
politics or in democratic public life beyond this – although liberal theorists and liberal 
polities are well known for periods of moralising, and ‘moral panic’, in which more 
specific moral obligations are pushed as being core to citizenly outlook and action.   
 
A number of critics have contrasted a version of a republican model of citizenship 
which runs directly counter to liberal views with respect to the obligation to public 
orientation and regard.  Republicanism is seen as a model or theory which requires or 
expects greater concern and involvement in public life for all citizens, seeing the 
pursuit of collective freedom, self-government and the development of individual 
capacity and participation as more valuable than individual freedoms and interests 
(Barber 1984). Many deliberative conceptions of democracy have republican roots, 
which are reflected in deliberative emphases upon public talk, public-regarding talk 
and reason-giving and the seeking of collective solutions to problems which reach 
beyond the calculus of narrow interest or potential individual or sub-group gain.   
 
Some of these deliberative threads find echoes in the context of other democratic 
innovations.  Democracy, it seems, in the eyes of many contemporary theorists, does 
not make sufficient demands on its citizens; or does not have a sufficiently expansive 
or challenging conception of citizenship which might stretch as well as capture the 
imaginations of most citizens at least some of the time.  Cosmopolitans, for example, 
would expand our roles as citizens in a couple of related ways.  First, in a more formal 
and technical sense, they would expand the range of polities within which we exercise 
familiar democratic roles, especially voting, from the local and national to the 
regional and global. And secondly – more complexly and more interestingly perhaps 
– cosmopolitans would have us stretch our imaginations not only to be public- and 
other-regarding with respect to our compatriots, but also with respect to people in 
other countries and regions.  The first approach would have us paying greater heed to 
the situations and needs of others by virtue of the fact that we literally become fellow 
citizens in some sense; the second would do it by asking us to extend citizenly regard 
and sympathies despite the fact (almost because of the fact) that the others in question 
are not in formal terms fellow citizens.  Ecological democrats, too, seek a stretching 
of our imaginations in ways that add demands and obligations to citizen roles.  
Having regard for more than one’s own interests is fine; having less self-serving 
regard for fellow human citizens even better.  But being prepared to live within the 
natural rhythms and confines of place, in other words to live sustainability and to 
learn to love it constitutes a broader set of expanded citizen obligations. 
 
Direct democrats (Budge 1996) offer a radical extension of (nevertheless) familiar 
liberal-representative democracy expectations of citizens.  Direct democrats of his ilk 
would have us voting on issues and not just candidates, and voting more often and 
more systematically – a bit like a cross between today’s Swiss and Californians.  
Direct democrats need, on one level, simply to note that most people in western 
democracies (and a range of others too) are much more educated than a few decades 
ago, have much more access to politically relevant information, and so on.  In other 
words, citizens can hardly help but be better informed today than (say) thirty or forty 
years ago.  To up the ante a touch in terms of expectations for how many times voting 
choices will or ought to be exercised does not seem to make an extra demands of 
kind, just of time and number.   
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To engage, to be more other-regarding and public-oriented; these are threads which 
are common to reformist and more radical extensions of citizen expectations and 
obligations.  There are other perspectives that are provocatively ambiguous in their 
possible implications for citizen roles.  Difference democrats raise the bar of 
expectations in a range of ways.  First, they stress the need for citizens to recognise 
(and by recognising, affirm in some sense) differences and diversity (or conflicting 
aspects of identity and perspective) within individuals, as well as across social and 
cultural groups with highly divergent outlooks and perspectives in society as a whole.  
Agreement on policy or aspects of common identity across difference needs to be the 
result of dialogue that is open to and embraces the strength of diverse perspectives.  
Some feminist critics of standard notions of citizenship, in particular, have  sought to 
extend our sense of what ‘counts’ as citizen activity across (differently conceived and 
various) public/private divides, and to take seriously what happens for example in the 
domestic sphere – child-rearing and domestic labour for example – as significant 
collective contributions made by citizens which should be valued and appreciated as 
part of an extended appreciation of what being a citizen involves (though as noted 
above feminist critics also stress the importance of action in the public sphere to 
advance feminist concerns). 
 
Before completing this section, I want to dwell briefly on the public/private 
distinction and opposition, as it cuts importantly across each of the framing questions 
I have employed here.  A number of innovative challenges to conventional democratic 
conceptions of citizenship question the positing or the location or indeed the valuing 
of a public/private divide.  It is as well to be clear that the public/private distinction 
has two separate dimensions , which deal with places and acts respectively: 
 
  ACTS  
  Public Private 
PLACES Public A B 
 Private C D 
 
 
Some theorists – and framing questions – stress the places for enacting citizenship.  
Others stress the acts themselves which constitute citizenly acts.  Others again, 
notably perhaps poststructuralist writers, stress that citizenship is about the very 
disruption and incompleteness of such a way of representing the categories of 
citizenship. 
 
 What are the places of citizenship – where citizens are found?  What are citizenly 
acts?  We tend to think of citizenship in both cases as being more about the public 
side of the equation.  But ecologists push citizenship more into the private sphere in 
the form of the home, for example, with such issues as recycling of domestic waste – 
a public act with public consequences but performed in a private place (C)?  Child-
rearing in the home might be public-in-private in this sense too.  Sexual activity is 
presumably private in private, but perhaps there is a public dimension even there – or, 
certain discourses of citizenship might push debates in that direction. And bringing 
supposedly private acts into the public domain can be a way of highlighting hidden or 
overlooked inequalities that bear on public regard4. 
                                                          
4 On these and related issues of public and private, see Steinberger (1999). 
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The key point here is that not only do democratic innovations expand the domains of 
citizenship – in theory and sometimes in practice – they change they way we think 
about some of those ‘domains’, too.  No simple public/private distinctions can be used 
to map changes in citizenship.  The picture is more changeable and complex than that. 
 
What does democracy expect of its citizens?  Enlarged mentality, greater 
participation, more other-regarding actions – these are some of the key recent 
responses from theorists.  Of course, on this question there have always been 
minimalists and maximalists, idealists and ‘realists’ among democratic theorists. 
Maximalist/idealists will always want better, more selfless, more publicly-oriented 
citizens. To that extent we are on familiar territory.  But the sheer range and style of 
some of the challenges and pressures are distinctive, as we have seen. 
 
 
Democratic spaces and citizen identities: rethinking political representation 
 
There is a spectre at the feast in much of the discussion so far.  It is possible that 
innovative democratic theories push back boundaries because that’s where theoretical 
logic and a sense of progressive politics leads them.  Equally, they may be following 
in the wake of something else which as absorbed much theoretical attention in recent 
years – the march of ‘governance’ into new domains, increasingly areas of life falling 
under state or state-like regulation, the expanded domains of security and surveillance 
and the ‘need’ (or at least the administrative appetite) for knowledge about myriad 
citizen practices.  Democracy and representation may be largely still understood as 
formal and hierarchical; but it seems that politics is increasingly broad, informal, 
network-based, and invasive.  Perhaps, for example, it is increasing governance of 
nature and non-human animals that leads where ecological democratic theorists 
experience the need to follow. 
 
In the context of more complex, expansive and differentiated practices of governance, 
basic concepts implicated in debates about democracy and citizenship need to be 
rethought.  One concept in urgent need of such rethinking is that of representation.  
Partly this is because we need to reconnect the idea of democratic representation with 
the practices of constituting citizen identities, as discussed above.  But further, it is 
clear that much political representation in today’s complex polities is non-electoral; if 
we are to assess the democratic credentials of non-electoral representation we shall 
need some radical rethinking.  I want to indicate the direction I see such rethinking 
necessarily taking. 
 
Jane Mansbridge’s recent advocacy of a shift in perspective from ‘singular, 
aggregatively-oriented, and district-based’ criteria for representation, to what she calls 
‘plural, deliberatively-oriented, and systemic criteria’ (2003) is highly welcome.  It is 
restricted only in that she develops it in the context of electoral representation only, 
and that she does not sufficiently problematise the construction of citizen identities 
through processes of political representation. 
 
On the latter point, about the construction of citizen identities through political 
representation, it is vital that we shift our perspective on representation to encompass 
the more aesthetic aspects of the concept.  In other words, political representatives 
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construct portrayals or depictions of the represented, in order to be able to represent 
them.  This is an unavoidable part of what it means to represent.  Citizen identities, on 
this view, are contested and contestable objects of claims that are made by would-be 
representatives, elected or otherwise.  Identities and expectations and locations rest 
upon the making of representations.   
 
 
Politicians often claim to be able to read off constituency and national interests, to 
have a unique hotline to voters’ real wants and needs.  But the fact is that they can 
only do so after first deploying an interpretative frame containing selective 
representations of their constituents. To speak for others – as elected representatives 
do, of course – is to make representations which render those others visible and 
readable. Linda Alcoff puts the point well: ‘In both the practice of speaking for as 
well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing 
the other’s needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are.  I am representing them 
as such and such … I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions.  
This act of representation cannot be understood as founded on an act of discovery 
wherein I discover their true selves and then simply relate my discovery’ (Alcoff 
1991, 9). 
 
Let’s return now to the issue of the democratic status of nonelectoral representation.  
But if many representatives – or those making claims to be representative – are not 
elected, how is democratic theory to understand them – and come up with appropriate 
criteria of democratic legitimacy?  Consider some of the types of new representative 
claim. First, A representative claim may be based on the idea that larger human 
interests and needs that are vital and need to be represented or voiced, but are too 
wide to receive sufficient voice in a national political system need to be given such 
voice.  One might consider for example the rock stars Bob Geldof and Bono and their 
advocacy of third world debt relief, famine relief and poverty alleviation.  Second, a 
representative claim may be based on the fact that an important perspective within a 
debate is not being heard or even voiced. For example a representative claim might be 
based on the idea that one is a surrogate spokesperson for a group that because of its 
geographical dispersion has no elected representative.  Third, a claim may be based 
on massive and tangible demonstration of popular support in the context of freedom 
of expression.  Fourth, a claim that may be based on mirroring, or descriptive 
similarity between the claimant and the audience or constituency he or she claims to 
speak or stand for.  For example, a deliberative poll (Fishkin and Luskin) or a 
citizens’ jury might actually be incorporated into the policy-making process and gain 
legitimacy from the random basis of its selection.  In many cases these groups are 
claimed to maximise social or descriptive representation.  Fifth, a representative claim 
might be based on the notion that one stands for or speaks for a group that has a 
material or other ‘stake’ in a process or a decision, and therefore has a right to have its 
interests included in the process.  Procedures which incorporate ‘stakeholders’ in 
deliberative and decisional forums can be quite formal, as was the case for example at 
the Johannesburg World Summit on Environment and Development in 2002.  
Potential stakeholders might be new or potential constituencies.  A radical vision of 
such a new constituency might be non-human animals and their interests, for example.  
Claims to represent or speak for human communities-of-fate which cross national 
boundaries may be another example (see Dobson 1996; Eckersley 2000). 
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How might democratic theorists evaluate such claims – not wanting to rule them out 
of court simply because of their non-elective basis?  In practice there will be multiple 
and overlapping criteria, which much room for deliberation over their democratic 
credentials.  To pick on possibilities which are most unusual and newest – thus 
connecting more to the democratic innovations discussed above - the criteria might 
include: 
 
A. A claim being democratically acceptable because the claimant’s activities are 
locked in to networks of informal accountability.  A representative claim 
might be based on the actor being ‘locked into’ a tight or dense network of 
organisational or other like ties, such that alternative forms of accountability 
become exercised. One might for example think in terms of the thickness of 
the ‘cobweb of connections in the ecology of communities’ (March and Olsen 
1995: 177).  There are various mechanisms for achieving accountability of 
organisation which do not require election.  Dense networks lend legitimacy 
arguable in part because they constrain actors in ways that are analogous to 
electoral constraints.   
 
B. Is a representative claim acceptable on the face of it precisely because it is 
untainted by formal election processes?  If Carl Schmitt was right that 
parliamentary democracy involved the embodiment of a certain ‘principled 
unprincipledness’ (Ankersmit), then perhaps there is always a ‘space’ for such 
claims?  Electoral pressures, it is sometimes argued, press those subject to 
them to look to short-term and parochial interests. They also force one to 
address – rhetorically at least – a wide array of concerns. 
 
C. Going one step further, is a claim acceptable precisely because it is untainted 
by formal membership of a state apparatus?  A distinctive version of this 
criterion is Dryzek’s ‘contest of discourses’ approach.  In my words rather 
than his, we could say that electoral processes are linked to the state, and that 
the state is tied into structural imperatives that prevent it from acting 
systematically in the interests of its citizens. Dryzek argues that ‘ … we can 
step back and ask whether democracy does indeed require counting heads.  I 
would argue that a logically complete alternative exists based on a 
conceptualisation of intersubjective communication in the public sphere as a 
matter of the contestation of discourses’ (Dryzek 2000, 84).  I do not want to 
go that far.  But perhaps dominant representations of discourses in such a 
‘contest of discourses’ could form the basis of non-elective representative 
claims?   
 
D. Is a claim justified precisely because it taps into non-electoral modes of 
political participation, such as (a) deliberation, (b) through voluntary 
associations, or (c) dissenting activism? Deliberative forums, whether of 
randomly chosen or part-selected or within or between voluntary associations, 
can give rise to compelling claims to represent considered popular opinion.  
Similarly, people can ‘do it for themselves’ (Bang and Dyrberg 2000), 
pursuing ‘individualised collective action’ in new and innovative ways 
(Micheletti 2003).  Dissenting activism can be conceived in terms of major 
social movements that seek to force a system to live up to its own ideals.  A 
key argument here is that democracy is not just about deliberation within 
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established forums.  Those forums can become sclerotic and moribund if they 
are not subject to pressure and renewal through outsider activism and dissent. 
 
In short, just as the scope and reach of governance processes now seep into new 
spaces and actions beyond conventionally ‘political’ ones, so it expands the domains 
in which political representation, in varied forms, operates within.  But such 
expansion brings with it the need to rethink the basic concept of representation in 
political theory – in its identity-producing effects, on the one hand, and in the criteria 
we might apply to increasingly prominent claims to be representative put forward by 
unelected actors. 
 
 
Enacting democracy 
 
We have seen a real plurality of expanded domains of democracy and citizenship.  
Both notions are being pulled in new directions, and are taking other key concepts, 
like representation, with them.  My blunt final question, in the light of this fact, is: can 
we any more offer a ‘theory of democracy’ in the face of such plurality, 
differentiation and complexity? 
 
My tentative answer is yes, so long as our strategy exploits that very plurality and 
complexity.  The way forward for democratic theory, I suggest, is to think in terms of 
the creative construction of democratic procedures, depending on the principles and 
purposes of the sponsor.  These theoretical constructions can then be used – as 
democratic theory has always been used – to provoke thinking about real world 
decision-making procedures. 
 
To a significant extent, the core concerns of most of the innovative ideas of 
democracy discussed crystallize in the particular political devices that they advocate – 
for example, for cosmopolitans, new supranational confederal arrangements; for 
deliberative democrats, for example, specific deliberative forums such as deliberative 
polls; political ecologists advocate (e.g.) proxy representation and special 
environmental defence institutions; and direct democrats advocate the use of the 
initiative and referendum devices. In such cases, these devices are allied to other, 
more familiar ones, like elected legislatures and constitutions conferring civil and 
political rights. Further, both singly and together, devices enact principles: variously 
autonomy, political equality, inclusion, the common interest, participation. In this 
sense, we can say that principles are primarily things that we do through the operation 
of political devices, rather than rights or statuses that are conferred. A deliberative 
poll, for example, enacts one sense of the principle of political equality; a policy 
referendum presents a quite different sense of the same principle. Including both of 
these devices in a real decision procedure different dimensions of political equality 
and inclusion for example. 
 
Viewing a democratic procedure as a sequence of devices, deployed so as to evoke 
certain principles and to provoke certain motivations in different groups and 
individuals, enables us to make connections across the innovations and the 
dimensions (Saward 2003). Bringing together procedural devices in new 
combinations enables us (in principle) to pool insights and hopes from deliberative, 
cosmopolitan, ecological and other advances. 
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Adopting this approach to democratic theory encourages and enables us to conceive 
of sequences of discrete devices in an enriched, complex and flexible idea of 
democratic procedure. Why not citizens’ initiatives to set the agenda, subsequent 
deliberative poll and parliamentary deliberation, followed by parliamentary decision 
to be endorsed by popular referendum, as a vision of a single democratic procedure? 
 
Such is the rich variety of democratic innovations today that we need a rather abstract, 
minimalist and proceduralist framework within which we can begin to see how 
apparently quite different innovations can be productively linked. Theories of ‘prefix 
democracy’ (deliberative’, ‘associative’, ‘direct’, ‘ecological’) can be too partisan and 
partial. By renewing and expanding the idea of a democratic procedure, we can weigh 
the rich array of new, alternative conceptions of democratic decision-making without 
in principle reducing democracy itself to any one of its specific institutional 
possibilities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the idea of democratic citizenship is being pushed into new, expanded 
domains. These domains are ones of kind (e.g. crossings of the human/non-human 
boundary), breadth (e.g. encompassing private spaces and actions as well as 
classically public ones), and depth (e.g. seeing citizens as more complex characters 
with more differentiated identities and potentialities).  Dominant and new 
perspectives on democracy give us different ideas as to where citizens are to be found, 
what to expect of them, and how they ought to be understood.  These perspectives 
press us, in turn, to rethink the scope and meaning of basic concepts, such as 
representation, and indeed to rethink basic questions about what it means to construct 
democratic theory. 
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